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      Honorable Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the*
Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No. 06-2307







Tom C. Gerhard and Wayne E. Nothstein,
Appellants
                              
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 02-cv-00049)
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo
                              
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 19, 2007
Before: McKEE, AMBRO and MICHEL , Circuit Judges*
(Opinion filed: May 7, 2007)
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OPINION
                              
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
This appeal involves a § 1983 action in which Robert Yurchak challenges his
termination as Chief Public Defender of Carbon County, Pennsylvania.  We need not
recite the facts at length, as they have been set out in previous opinions, see Yurchak v.
Cty. of Carbon, No. 3:02-CV-0049, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16526 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 22,
2006) (Yurchak III); Yurchak v. Cty. of Carbon, 84 Fed. Appx. 218 (3d Cir. 2003)
(Yurchak II), Yurchak v. Cty. of Carbon, No. 02-cv-0049 (M.D. Pa. May 7, 2002)
(Yurchak I).  In brief, Yurchak argues that the Carbon County Board of Commissioners,
composed mainly of Republican members, improperly fired him in violation of his First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  He contends that the then-Commissioners Tom C.
Gerhard and Wayne E. Nothstein terminated him because he ran unsuccessfully for a
judgeship on the Democratic ticket against a Republican candidate whom they supported. 
The Commissioners filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, raising the defense of
qualified immunity.  The District Court denied the motion to dismiss, and we affirmed. 
Yurchak II, 84 Fed. Appx. at 220.  Reading the facts in the light most favorable to
Yurchak, we agreed with the District Court’s conclusion that, under Branti v. Finkel, 445
U.S. 507, 519 (1980), it was clearly established that “the independent nature of a public
defenders office meant that political affiliation was not an appropriate requirement for the
3position of Chief Public Defender . . . [and] Carbon County [therefore] could not
terminate [Yurchak’s] employment based on his political affiliation.”  Yurchak II, 84 Fed.
Appx. at 219 (citing Yurchak I).  However, we noted that nothing barred the
Commissioners from demonstrating that they were entitled to qualified immunity at the
summary judgment stage if they could “present a set of facts sufficient to refute
Yurchak’s allegations, distinguish the Carbon County Chief Public Defender position
from the position at issue in Branti, and show that its actions were not in violation of
‘clearly established’ law.”  Id. at 219 n.2. 
The Commissioners apparently did not take our statement as an invitation to make
that demonstration, except by re-stating their contentions that the Chief Public Defender
position was a policy-making job for which political affiliation was an appropriate
employment criterion.  In the alternative, they argued that they terminated Yurchak not
for political affiliation, but for his alleged impropriety in using the Public Defender’s
secretary for private matters.  Between our 2003 decision and the District Court’s 2006
decision now on appeal (Yurchak III), they performed no additional discovery that might
have produced evidence sufficient to refute Yurchak’s claims and no new legal arguments
sufficient to distinguish the Chief Public Defender position here from the position at issue
in Branti.  In fact, the only additional discovery came from Yurchak.  In 2004, he deposed
the only two employees who worked at the Carbon County Election Bureau during the
time in question—Kenneth Leffler (Election Director) and Lisa Yackanicz (Election
       The District Court had jurisdiction in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We retain1
jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review the District Court’s denial of
qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
527–28 (1985), and over the denial of summary judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
Our review of denials of qualified immunity is plenary.  Atkinson v. Taylor, 316
F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2003).  Our review of summary judgment decisions is also plenary
and we apply the same standard as the District Court.  See, e.g., Scheidemantle v. Slippery
Rock Univ. State System of Higher Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 539 (3d Cir. 2006).  On appeals
of ordinary summary judgment decisions, we may review only questions of law.  Walker
v. Horn, 286 F.3d 705, 710 (3d Cir. 2002).  On appeals of summary judgment decisions
with respect to political discrimination claims, the standard of review is modified insofar
as it remains the Government’s burden to “prove that political affiliation is an appropriate
requirement for the job.”  Armour v. County of Beaver, 271 F.3d 417, 420 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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Clerk).  Both  testified that Commissioner Gerhard frequently came in to ask about
political party affiliations.  In 2005, Yurchak deposed Robert Potestio and Larry Skinner,
both of whom served on the Republican Executive Board with Commissioner Gerhard. 
Each testified that Gerhard espoused a policy of firing Democrats and hiring Republicans
when the latter controlled the government, and that he did not believe that this policy
should be limited to policy positions.  
The District Court concluded that the Commissioners were not entitled to qualified
immunity and denied the motion for summary judgment.  It reasoned that political
affiliation was an inappropriate criterion for the position of Chief Public Defender
because it was not a policy-making position, that the relevant law to that effect was
clearly established when the Board fired Yurchak, and that there was enough evidence to
allege that two of the Board Members acted with improper motives in terminating him. 
Yurchak III, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16526, at *3.  The Commissioners appeal to us.1
Where the First Amendment is at issue, we must “undertake exacting review of the whole
record with a particularly close focus on facts that are determinative of a constitutional
right.”  Id. (citing Zold v. Township of Mantua, 935 F.2d 633, 636 (3d Cir. 1991)).
5
We need not consider the merits of this appeal, as we have already concluded that
Yurchak alleged a colorable claim of a constitutional violation of clearly established law. 
Yurchak II, 84 Fed. Appx. at 219.  When we first considered this case, we left open the
possibility that the Commissioners could assert a qualified immunity defense successfully,
provided they could distinguish the Chief Public Defender’s position here from the
position at issue in Branti.  They have presented no evidence to do so.  We therefore
conclude that “because [Yurchak’s] evidence was at least as strong” in the
Commissioners’ first interlocutory appeal “as it was at the summary judgment stage, our
prior ruling . . . controls our resolution of this appeal.  . . .  Any other ruling would
insufficiently adhere to our prior resolution . . .[,] which is the law of the case.”  In re City
of Phila. Litigation, 158 F.3d 711, 722 (3d Cir. 1998); see also St. Thomas-St. John Hotel
& Tourism Assoc. v. Virgin Islands, 357 F.3d 297, 301–02 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[P]laintiffs
have pointed to no adequate reason for departing from [our previous] holding.  . . .  There
[are] no intervening new facts or law.”).  Moreover, we agree with the District Court that
the Commissioners fail to demonstrate that there are no material issues of disputed fact
that would preclude a jury trial or that the facts, read in the light most favorable to
Yurchak, require a grant of summary judgment in their favor.  To the contrary, the
evidence presented by Yurchak in support of his allegations suffices for a jury trial, as the
6question whether the Commissioners’ motives were discriminatory, and therefore in
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, is a genuine issue of disputed material
fact.  Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s determination that the Commissioners
are not entitled to qualified immunity and thus its denial of their motion for summary
judgment.
